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Abstract
Technological and social evolutions have prompted operational, phenomenological, and
ontological shifts in communication processes. These shifts, we argue, trigger the need to
regard human and machine roles in communication processes in a more egalitarian fashion.
Integrating anthropocentric and technocentric perspectives on communication, we propose an agent-agnostic framework for human-machine communication. This framework
rejects exclusive assignment of communicative roles (sender, message, channel, receiver)
to traditionally held agents and instead focuses on evaluating agents according to their
functions as a means for considering what roles are held in communication processes. As
a first step in advancing this agent-agnostic perspective, this theoretical paper offers three
potential criteria that both humans and machines could satisfy: agency, interactivity, and
influence. Future research should extend our agent-agnostic framework to ensure that communication theory will be prepared to deal with an ostensibly machine-inclusive future.

Keywords: meaning-making, communicative functions, machine agency,
anthropocentrism, technocentrism

Introduction
Early computer-mediated communication experiences emerged as computers were linked
together for technical purposes (data redundancy, security, and transfer, largely within
research and government communities) and humans began to organize themselves around
data networks and machine actors (Leiner et al., 1997). Despite these machine-machine
transaction roots of contemporary communication, machines’ roles in communication
processes are often relegated to that of facilitating or interfering with humans’ sending and
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receiving of messages (Gunkel, 2012). In turn, early human-computer interaction studies
took up the dynamics of software and hardware—from hypertext to peripherals—as efficient tools for users’ activities (Myers, 1998). Despite the centrality of human goals and
influences to human-computer interaction, technologists often consider humans only in
terms of their actions (Kaptelinin, 2012). That is, users present “human problems,” both
in reference to the problems that humans face and solve through technology (Blomqvist,
2018, para. 3) and in reference to how humans create problems to which technology must
be resilient (Kletz, 1982, p. 209).
Arguably, one of the simplest but most foundational frameworks for understanding
communication as a dyadic process is the transmission model of communication (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), in which sources create messages that are then encoded into signals sent over channels (through some degree of noise) then decoded for consumption
by receivers. Taken in terms of this model, scholarship within communication disciplines
often characterizes machines merely as channels, and scholarship within the technological
disciplines tends to characterize humans merely as senders or receivers. The parceling out
of human and machine roles across disciplines is part of each domain’s strength in building
rich understandings of those roles. However, such parceling is also each domain’s weakness in that disciplinary blinders prevent important integration of theoretical and empirical
work given that the boundaries of what counts as “human” and “machine” are increasingly
blurred.
Although some contend the transmission model is obsolete (e.g., for rigidity and linearity; Day, 2000), we argue that the model is a useful tool for approaching emerging sociotechnical phenomena. The model focuses on core communicative functions independent
of agent type, and such independence is fundamental for initially catalyzing necessary integration between human-focused and technology-focused paradigms. The model can only
be applied to that end, however, if it is engaged in a more egalitarian fashion. Following,
this theoretical paper proposes a reframing of the transmission model (as a parsimonious
starting point) that focuses on agent functions rather than on heuristic agent roles such that
humans and machines should both be considered candidate-actors for all components of
the model. Such an approach is vital to advancing human-machine communication (HMC)
scholarship in that it promotes attention to the “missing mass” of HMC (see Latour, 1992,
p. 227)—those unattended-to dynamics of the emerging, unintuitive, and surprising ways
that humans and machines make meaning together. Without this very purposeful attention to agent function independent of traditional roles, we risk overlooking the humanistic
function of machines and machinic functions of humans.
Our proposition is simultaneously not-new (in that its assumptions are discretely present in more than three decades of communication technology scholarship, outlined below)
and new (in that they have not yet been integrated into an accepted paradigm for conducting such scholarship). We first briefly characterize anthropocentric and technocentric
communication paradigms, illuminate recent technological and social shifts that drive the
need for an agent-agnostic lens in addressing HMC, describe our operationalization of an
agent-agnostic approach as grounded in attention to agent functions, and then outline candidate functions for consideration in such an approach.
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Anthropocentric and Technocentric Views on Communication
The roles of humans and machines in communication processes are generally engaged via
two paradigms. The first is anthropocentric: humans are supreme in relation to other things
(including machines) and the world is interpreted principally according to human experience and values (Nass et al., 1995). The other is technocentric: technology’s inherent features and capacities are fundamental enablers (Papert, 1987) and constrainers (Woolgar,
1990) of human activity, and humans and environments orient around and adapt to them
(Schmoldt, 1992).
The anthropocentric position adopts a relatively narrow view of machines as tools
in support of human-to-human interlocution (see Gunkel, 2012). Much of this engagement stems (as Gunkel notes) from early references to “computer conferencing systems”
defined as “any system that uses the computer to mediate communication among human
beings” (Hiltz & Turroff, 1993, p. 30). In relation to the transmission model, that work often
defaults to discrete human and machine roles in communication processes. Specifically, the
sender and receiver are human (e.g., citizens), while the encoder, decoder, and channel are
machinic (e.g., platforms for facilitating voter literacy). This exclusive role-ascription generates rich understandings of machines’ functional roles in communication, yet it limits the
scope to machines’ instrumental interactivity—human use of technology toward some end
(Lister et al., 2009). These works orient themselves toward the problematics and possibilities
of technological mediation while missing machines’ functioning in other communicative
roles. Here, attention is importantly paid to communication through machines (e.g., human
behaviors, risks, and values associated with social networks; see Kapoor et al., 2018) holistically at the discount of communication with machines.
The technocentric position is occupied, in turn, by scholars adopting similarly narrow views of machines as resources or tools in optimization of processes (Taylor & Todd,
1995), generally without attention to the ways that machines are socially constructed in
their use (Bijker et al., 1987). A machine is a designed artifact, system, or procedure that
shapes human users’ experience and actions through the “unfolding” of possibilities (Tidwell, 1999). Although technocentric work often does not formally take up the transmission model despite the framework’s origins in technical systems design (Shannon, 1948),
similar-but-inverse defaulting to agent-specific roles in terms of that model can still be
drawn from those works. Machines are designed and understood largely as senders/encoders and receivers/decoders (e.g., generating or seeking information; Mardini et al., 2018)
while humans (although indeed important to some processes) are nearly treated as noise
or obstacles in computing tasks. Although humans are the progenitor for much machine
activity, they are also the component of machine processes whose shortcomings must be
muddled through (i.e., human-fault-tolerant design; De Santis et al., 2008). These works
orient toward problematics and possibilities of technologies’ design and function as generators or recipients of information while missing considerations of the meaning thereof. Said
another way, emphasis is precisely placed on communication dynamics among humans and
machines but often at the discount of the import and experience of those messages.
Sprung from these semantically competing paradigms are rich bodies of work bounded
by disciplinary assumptions and aims that, holistically, exist in tension. In relation to humans,
machines are discussed both as empowering (Beer, 2009) and constraining (Gagliardone,
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2016), controlled (Plotnick, 2017) and automated (Fortunati, 2017), generative (Hasinoff,
2013) and destructive (Hakkarainen, 2012). Nonetheless, both paradigms are in some ways

compatible. The nature of each agent class’s influence over the other, and their situation
across time and space, such that integration based on agent roles or functions is appropriate
(see Fortunati, 2014). It is, therefore, necessary for HMC scholars to address these tensions
to keep pace with scholarly and practical shifts in how machines function, are experienced,
and may integrate into contemporary society.

Drivers for an Agent-Agnostic Approach to Communication
Both technological and social evolutions have prompted shifts in human and machine participations in communication processes. These shifts drive a need to consider agents in
a fashion more functionally egalitarian—one that considers how each agent category has
sufficient “basic capabilities” to perform functions and so warrant equal consideration (Sen,
1979, p. 218). Before exploring such an agent-agnostic approach to considering humanmachine communication processes, however, it is useful to consider shifts in what may
count as the relevant basic capabilities.

Operational Shifts
Perhaps most intuitive are machines’ emergent functions in traditionally human communicative capacities: message sources, receivers, and feedback initiators. As information sources, voice assistants like Siri generate and convey messages in fashions that elicit
human responses more closely mirroring interpersonal human processes than utilitarian
technology-use processes (e.g., differentiating among machine voices in performance evaluations; Nass & Steuer, 1993). As sources, machines such as social robots may be perceived
as intentionally generating messages, and mental states are attributed to those machines if
the vocal or visual cues are sufficiently close to humans’ (Banks, 2019). As message receivers, autonomous machines may function as sociable partners with epistemologies of their
own (Breazeal, 2004) even if we cannot (yet) discern that form of cognition (cf. Bogost,
2012) such that we may need to consider, for instance, whether and how humans should
adjust language patterns in order to be understood by a chatbot. Machines also engage in
feedback-initiator roles by anticipating human responses (Pantic et al., 2007) and adapting behaviors and responses to user inputs and contexts, as with domain-specific chatbot
feedback (Shawar & Atwell, 2007) or semi-autonomous avatars’ rejection/correction of user
requests (Banks, 2015).
In turn, humans can function in traditionally machinic communicative roles: habitual
message encoders/decoders or mediating channels. They may take up information generated by sociotechnical systems and encode responses that are not necessarily authentic or
original information but are encoded according to norm or habit (e.g., responding to Facebook posts through phatic “likes”; see Hayes et al., 2016). Humans also function as message
channels or repositories, carrying or retaining information for the purpose of delivering it
to another recipient (Cowan, 1988) as when committing a license plate number to memory in order to tell a police officer. In that way, organic bodies are multimodal themselves,
with visual and aural channels (i.e., gesture and voice; Mehrabian, 1972). Even further, the

Banks and de Graaf

23

body may function as an interface between the world and the brain, conveying sensory
information across the Cartesian divide (Biocca, 1997). Humans also function as decoders
of information; accessing, filtering, and breaking down information into usable pieces, as
when deciphering news content on social media to determine which represent authentic or
fake news (De Keersmaecker & Roets, 2017).
Ultimately, machines perform traditional human communication functions and
humans perform traditional machinic functions. This requires recharacterization of both as
variably intelligent, interactive agents (Chesebro & Bonsall, 1989) and as variably facilitative
instruments.

Phenomenological Shifts
The way that humans and machines are experienced by others has also shifted. Machines
and the information they convey may be experienced as human(like), which affects perceptions of how interactions with them should proceed (de Graaf et al., 2016). This machine
anthropomorphism—a perceiving as or imbuing with humanness(likeness)—emerges as
humans apprehend and process social cues (Epley et al., 2007) and then engage in increasingly social reactions. Cueing may be visual (e.g., inviting buttons to facilitate collaboration), aural (e.g., mobile assistant voices that extend offers to help), kinetic (e.g., animated
emoji movements such as a wave gesture or confetti projection), proxemic (e.g., spatial
avatar behaviors like following or clustering), and/or chronemic (e.g., chatbot response lag
times). This signaling facilitates experiences of machines as human(like), such that users
develop relationships with them (Banks, 2015; de Graaf et al., 2016) or engage content representing actual and non-actual phenomena as actually real (Nowak, 2003). In tandem with
anthropomorphism, this sense of realness may rely on perceptions of agency, toward the
application of human metaphors to understand machine functioning (e.g., “an electronic
brain”; Bolter, 1984, p. 40).
In turn, humans are also experienced to some extent as machinic. The human-asmachine metaphor emerged by some accounts through media representations of troped,
uncanny characters (androids, autonomous dolls; see Neisser, 1966). In line with modernist perspectives on human behavior as rooted in observable, measurable, and predictable
behaviors (Gergen, 1991), we have come to liken human thought and action to computer
programming and machine action (see Newell & Simon, 1972) such that lay understandings of behaviors rely on references to processing, interfacing, or even being cogs in the
system (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Humans subjectively and actually draw on social
infrastructures (e.g., network structures; Rainie & Wellman, 2012) to conduct information
exchanges subject to specific protocols (e.g., conversations according to social norms; Jackson, 1965) via algorithms or programs (e.g., schemata or scripts; Axelrod, 1973), evidently
toward the presentation and application of that information (i.e., stimulation of meaning
in the other’s mind; McCroskey, 1992). Mechanization of domestic spaces sees technology’s
active (albeit often opaque) shaping of humans’ leisure time and private spaces (Fortunati,
2006), and technology and humanity are thought to mutually and cooperatively evolve (i.e.,
as a collective and connective intelligence; Longo, 2003). These characterizations, importantly, reveal that (independent of actual integrations, syntheses, or overlaps), people experience humans and machines in non-exclusive ways.
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Such phenomenological shifts suggest a need to de-privilege instrumentalist views on
technologies (e.g., Heidegger, 1977). Positions that frame machines as mere tools limit the
evaluation of their functionality to their human-intended purposes (rather than actual or
potential behaviors). Instead, machines must be regarded as part of (and not apart from)
the social structure of everyday human life with the ability to steer human behaviors and
influence interaction outcomes (Latour, 1994). Hence, the role of machines in interactions with humans, and in society as a whole, is not restricted to the machine’s mechanisms, physical and technical properties, or actual abilities (de Graaf, 2016). Rather,
machines are also materially embedded and participate in meaning-making processes;
from self-driving cars choosing quickest or most scenic routes to the construction of
music consumption experiences sans material artifacts (Puntoni, 2018). Notably, our use
of “meaning-making” here does not assume that machines can or must encode or decode
information in the same fashion as do humans (cf. Bogost, 2012). Rather, we contend
that the attention to meaning-making as a fundamental communication process is likewise to be accounted for agnostically: agents make meaning as a function of their intrinsic natures such that the process, product, or effects of machine-made meaning may be
different from but not lesser than human-made meaning. In the same turn, it may not
necessarily be that they are different, as both artificial and natural intelligence may draw
from frames, scripts, schemas, routines, and maps (see Tenkasi & Boland, 1993). We take
up meaning-making as a system’s response (behavioral, computational, or otherwise) to
an environmental signal from which information is extracted and during which value is
assigned (Neuman, 2006). In all, these meaning-making processes contribute to the shape
of society, as social structures in turn influence the shape of humans and machines (see
MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). We come to know occupants of each category through our
experience of the other—so much so that even the boundaries of agent ontologies may
not be as solid as they once were.

Ontological Shifts
Finally, in tandem with operational and phenomenological shifts, ontological shifts can be
observed. While operational shifts account for how agents work and phenomenological
shifts are a matter of how agent classes are experienced, ontological shifts are a more objective consideration of what each class is and whether they are actually separate. The ontological categories of “human” and “machine” have long been and are still converging through
proximations in appearance, roles, and some forms of intelligence (cf. Biocca, 1997) and
through functional interdependence (cf. Marx, 1887). Here, we’ll define a human, liberally,
as an entity with personhood via functional and moral qualities of a unified, conscious
member of the species Homo sapiens (Taylor, 1985). In turn, a machine is an “an assembly
of parts that transmit and modify forces, motion, and energy one to another in a predetermined manner” (Harada, 2001, p. 456) where forces and motion include the internal
workings of physical systems (see Seltzer, 2014) and energy includes information (Khurmi
& Gupta, 2005).
Machines with increasingly humanlike social cues encourage people to engage in social
interaction and “push our Darwinian buttons” with their displayed behaviors that humans
associate with sentience, intentions, and emotions (Turkle, 2010, p. 3). For instance, although
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Twitter bots were originally designed for the retweeting of existing content, programming
advances have brought forth bots that populate profiles, emulate humans’ chronemic posting signatures, comment on others’ posts, identify influencers and seek to gather followers,
and clone some human(like) behaviors (Ferrara et al., 2016). This causes machines to ontologically fluctuate between something animate (adhering to human-category frameworks
for sociability) and something inanimate (adhering to machine-category rigidity; de Graaf,
2016; de Graaf et al., 2016) such that they may actually constitute a new category of agent
altogether (Kahn et al., 2011).
In parallel, humans may be categorized in some contexts as more machinic than social,
very literally functioning as machines: “device[s] with a large number of internal . . . states”
(Pentland & Liu, 1999, p. 229)—and as biological machines with a talent for semantics over
syntax (Searle, 1990). Human behavior relies, to an extent, on (semi-)invariant rules and
algorithms for how language, reasoning, and behaviors in relation to these states (e.g., such
as encoding and decoding of symbols and reliance on cognitive shortcuts; Simon, 1990),
such that human behavior can be computationally modeled and predicted (Subrahmanian
& Kumar, 2017). Specific to communication behaviors, human-authored digital messages
are both produced and consumed as entertainment—as informational or experiential
assets—rather than necessarily according to socioemotional drives, as with the commodification of personal information inherent to dating apps (Hobbs et al., 2017).
There is rising fuzziness between human and machine categories and advances in
cyborg potentials both in very literal and material integrations (e.g., mechanical limbs, biomimetic technology; Barfield & Williams, 2017) and in looser configurations (e.g., a person
wearing a watch or using a keyboard; see Gunkel, 2000). Following, there are less-concrete
distinctions among modes of (non-)aliveness compared to our traditional understandings
of those states (Jipson & Gelman, 2007). For instance, biohybrid robots combine organic
components (like cultured muscle tissues) with machine components (like gels, electrodes,
and metal frameworks) so that electrical stimulation allows the robot to perform humanlike behaviors like joint movement (see Morimoto, Onoe, & Takeuchi, 2018). Hence, when
a biohybrid robot moves a hand or a finger, is that agent somehow alive? The aggregation
of human and machine traits, components, or actions can result in an “overuse” of human
categories for machines and associated application of group norms (Nass & Moon, 2000,
p. 82). As ontological distinctions fade (Guzman, 2016a, 2018), some call for recognizing
new ontologies for sophisticated sociable machines (Kahn et al., 2011) and recognizing
entities beyond the “outdated category” of human (i.e., acknowledging the posthuman or
transhuman; Wentzer & Mattingly, 2018, p. 144). Rather than arguing for more ontological
categories in addressing communication dynamics, we suggest instead a reframing: shift
away from agent categories to instead attend to the functions enacted.

Toward Human-Machine Equity in the Transmission Model
Considering those operational, phenomenological, and ontological shifts in humans’ and
machines’ roles in communication processes, the transmission model requires re-examination. Recall that the model refers to the cumulative structure of a message source (or sender)
encoding (translating meaning indicators) a message (some information) over a channel (some medium) which is then decoded (otherwise translated) for interpretation by a
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target (or receiver), generally with some accounting for noise (signal disturbance). Although
humans and machines are typically assigned to particular roles, we argue that humans and
machines are potentially equivalent actors in communication processes. Following, we work
here toward an egalitarian reframing of HMC processes (moving away from default roles and
toward considering basic capabilities) and suggest directions for inquiry through this lens.

Human-Machine Communication as Agent-Agnostic
Transmission
Given that both humans and machines have been shown to function as actors across all
stages of the transmission model of communication, we advance a decades-old, crossdisciplinary sentiment (that isolating agent types is epistemologically problematic; e.g.,
Giuseppe & Galimberti, 1998) by proposing a reframing of the transmission model that
accounts for ways that both humans and machines can function as both functional and
social actors according to the same criteria. We draw here on the notion of HMC as the
“creation of meaning among humans and machines” (Guzman, 2018, p. 1), in which one
or more agents relay data among others and in which meaning is encoded and decoded
according to the native modes of each agent. This definition subsumes characterizations
from technocentric perspectives privileging the agency of machines in social interactions
as well as those from anthropocentric perspectives privileging humans as relevant agents.
HMC is regarded as an umbrella concept acknowledging varied actors according to varied functions (Guzman, 2016b) toward more inclusive and more flexible consideration of
humans-machine sense-making.
We advocate, as a starting point, an approach that (1) considers each agent’s functions in
the process (with attention to functions that may not be directly observable) and (2) draws
on literatures pertaining to those functions (independent of enacting agent) to consider
how meaning may emerge through antecedents, processes, and effects of that function. This
agnosticism must be engaged through a lens akin to Dennett’s physical stance (1989) in
which we would consider HMC according to our knowledge of the manifest properties of
agents (and not what they are meant to do or what they may be said to intend). Although
the physical stance is seldom engaged due to its complexity (e.g., delivering a physical
account of the exact material processes and states that lead a chatbot to produce a response
would be multiplex; Stich, 1981, see also Krassmann et al., 2019 for an example of one
layer of such processes) and we may only engage it imperfectly, the attempt to question and
discover agent functions is necessary and core to the application of functions as criteria in
transmission processes. That is, to be agnostic toward agent class is to be diligent in rejecting its assumptions and attending to functions. For instance, in considering a question of
how Internet-connected devices (e.g., a smart toothbrush; van der Zeeuw et al., 2019) might
function in humans’ self-concepts, we might consider a “traditional” transmission-model
mapping: a human user (Source) uses a device (let us continue with a smart toothbrush, a
Channel) and in so doing performs certain behaviors (brush strokes, Encoded as data, from
discrete movements); the behavioral information or lack thereof (here, Messages sent per
brushstroke performed) are aggregated (Decoded and perhaps transformed to another data
type) and re-presented by a Receiving application (i.e., one that might store and analyze that
data) to deliver Feedback to the user.
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Acknowledging that this is a simplification of such a process, if we decenter the human
from that situation and consider the ways that other entities may function in a sender role,
a host of other possibilities arise relative to other visit actors (device, application, motor)
and (sub)components not readily observable (e.g., software, information packets, router).
In tandem, removing assumptions about what actor fits what model block, the multiplex
mapping of transmissions might instead consider how that machine manifests relationships
with tangible and intangible objects in its orbit. For instance, we may also come to consider that the device (Source) transmits experience-generated information (Message) with
its software (Receiver) that prompts delivery of a reminder “beep” (Feedback). That beep is
not merely a feature, it is a self-referencing message with potential meaning, generated by
the software (Sender) via the toothbrush (Channel) to the constellated human (Receiver).
Notably, this is but one potential interrogation of the candidate model, where each of
the possible processes embedded may to some extent be relevant to a particular course
of research. We argue, however, that unless the model is explored in this agent-agnostic
fashion, we are unlikely to recognize and understand the missing mass within human/
machine interlocution. That is, we will be limited in considering (a) the ways that machines
negotiate, push back on, and shape interactions and (b) the ways humans are script-driven
and mediating. When we miss this mass, we may fail to acknowledge machine agency and
human proceduralism.
The hunt for missing mass in this fashion is not incommensurable with existing
anthropo- or techno-centric perspectives—indeed it depends on them. Each domain
trends toward specific functional features. Human-focused domains feature strong theories associated with agency, meaning-making, phenomenology, and behavioral outcomes.
Technology-focused domains, on the other hand, feature strong theories of affording and
constraining action, system and information dynamics, and concrete cause/effect protocols.
Each body of literature may be most productively engaged when it is considered according
to processes described that may apply to human or machine agents—but first, those common functions must be identified.

Functions as Criteria for Transmission Model Consideration
We have argued that an agent-agnostic transmission model rests on considering the common functioning or abilities of humans and machines that permit them to occupy each
position in the model. From the practical and definitional ground articulated, we propose
there are at least three classes of common functions that should be considered in determining whether an agent is acting in a particular communicative capacity: agency, interactivity,
and influence. These are the basic capabilities that, when held, may be adequate to qualify
an agent as occupying a particular role. This is not to say that agents will necessarily and
equivalently occupy all positions. Rather, these functional criteria are a ground for considering whether they may occupy a given position. We also do not go so far as to outline
kinds or degrees of these criteria for particular roles in the model. Instead, our aim here is to
initially set forth the possible shared capabilities (rather than distinct human and machine
capabilities; Kiousis, 2002) as a springboard for future theorizing that not only accounts
for machines’ current functional capabilities but is also resilient to considerations for their
expected and imagined future capabilities.
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The ground function of agency (including autonomy and potential intentionality) is
defined as the capacity to make a difference through action (Cooren, 2004; Latour, 2014).
Note that agency as a specific capacity to matter is distinct from our use of the term “agent”
which more generally denotes actors that cause or initiate some event. Broadly, agency has
been exclusively reserved for the living (Giddens, 1984), as we readily associate life and
intentionality as preconditions for authentic action. Yet, a vast body of research acknowledges the interventions of nonhumans in our everyday life: a speed bump makes you slow
down (Latour, 1994); a memo informs employees of new policy (Cooren, 2004); a thermometer co-shapes our experience of health and disease (Verbeek, 2005). Indeed, some
social theory defines agency as “socio-culturally mediated capacity to act” (Ahern, 2001,
p. 110). That definition deliberately embraces the inclusivity of machines, spirits, signs, and
collective entities, and recognizes the cultural relativity of the notion of social action by all
kinds of agents in certain contexts. It may be intuitive to recognize agency in embodied
social computational systems (e.g., personified smartphones, [semi-]autonomous cars, and
robotic objects capable of sociable interactions) as they elicit a unique, affect-charged sense
of active agency experienced as similar to that of living entities (Young et al., 2011). It may
be less obvious, though, that even non-embodied systems have inherent agency, as interfaces, algorithms, and network switches engage in material and semiotic ways of mattering
in the course of meaning-making processes.
The operational shifts outlined note that both humans and machines can take on
the role of the communicator: sending and receiving messages. Within communication
sequences, agency can be understood as a potential standing-in of one actor for another
when the other has lost its own ability to act or exert influence (as when a human cannot
instantaneously travel long distances, a cadre of computers stands in for that limitation;
Latour, 2014). This alternating of classical human and machine roles may be understood as
a “dance of agency” (Pickering, 1995, p. 116). Examinations of agency in an agent-agnostic
approach to HMC would attend, then, to the capacity for or enactment of instrumental
force. That is, the ways that both humans and/or machines enact message production and
reception (e.g., initiation of social and news messages; Neff & Nagy, 2016), effectively convey information (e.g., channel functions in relation to inherent affordances for social cues;
Aldunate & González-Ibáñez, 2017), and through action contribute to meaning-making
(e.g., influencing formation of social judgments; Nowak, 2004). In tandem, acknowledging
the agency of nonhumans by no means diminishes human agency. It merely makes fair consideration of the ways that humans and nonhumans shape each other as they cooperatively
make meaning (Williams & Edge, 1996).
The second common property (derived, in part, from the first) is potential for interactivity, or the variable process of serial information exchange in which each transmission is
contingent upon the prior, creating a binding social force (see Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997).
This potential relies on each agent’s capability to encode/decode sign systems, such as those
present in material exchanges and semiotic exchanges. Extending that conceptualization to
material exchanges, objects engage in interaction with humans when a video game controller
decodes a button-press as an input and may deliver haptic feedback as an output (Roth et
al., 2018). Notably, that exemplar may be interpreted as reactivity rather than interactivity
(the button is pushed and action occurs). However, that is an anthropocentric interpretation
of interactivity requiring human-native self-referencing (which may or may not emerge in
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machines in the future). From the common-function’ approach proposed here, the delivery
of haptic feedback is considered a meaningful machine-native message in the same way that
a human (if pushed) might shout “ouch” in return. Emphasizing semiotic exchanges, both
humans and neural networks are interpreting meaning when they absorb images to create
new graphics (Kowatari et al., 2009). Future research into this shared property may consider
exchange structures (e.g., turn-taking and conversation dominance) and the dynamics of
CMC-based human/machine collaboration (e.g., action coordination and problem-solving).
Finally, humans and machines share (as a product of the first and second properties),
the potential to influence one another: to realize a potential to functionally matter to and
manifest effects on the other. Scholarship investigating this shared property may attend to the
ways that agents are capable of social and material impact. Certainly, people can influence
machines, for instance through physical manipulations, design and programming, modding,
and providing raw material for machine learning. Just the same, machines can influence
humans. Machines induce emotional responses: humans experience increased physiological
arousal when a robotic toy is being tortured (Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al., 2013) and act
spitefully after feeling betrayed by a computer (Ferdig, & Mishra, 2004). How a system communicates with its users indirectly affects one’s engagement with the machine, including trust
and blame for (in)action (e.g., Lyons & Havig, 2014). These cognitive and affective responses
by human users to machines demonstrate perceptions of accountability for machine influence. Moreover, researchers have started to debate machine’s perceived worthiness of moral
care and consideration—regardless of whether that is technically feasible or even desirable
(Gunkel, 2017)—which indicates reciprocal effects caused by that influence.

Conclusion
Considering the evolution of operational, ontological, and phenomenological shifts in
humans’ and machines’ roles in media communication, we advocate shifting to an agentagnostic transmission model of communication. By endorsing a decades-old critique articulating a problematic isolating of agent types and normative roles (e.g., Giuseppe & Galiberti, 1998), we stress that humans and machines have the potential to be theoretically
and operationally equivalent agents in communication processes as both social and functional actors according to the same criteria of agency, interactivity, and influence. Drawing on the HMC paradigm (principally, that meaning-making is a joint activity among
human and machine agents), anthropocentric and technocentric perspectives are acknowledged as specific permutations of how humans and machines engage each other in the
loop of transmission communication, but not the only permutations. Rather, humans and
machines are potentially equivalent interlocutors with potentially equivalent psychological,
social, and moral consequences. We see this proposal as a first step in advancing agentagnostic perspectives in HMC. Future scholarship is encouraged to explore the ways that
our propositions may (and may not) extend to more complex models of communication
(e.g., transactional, interactive, and constructionist models), and investigate the dynamics
and contexts by which human and machinic agents may (and may not) occupy positions
in those models. Such examinations will help to ensure that communication theory keeps
pace with communication technology itself lest the discipline be poorly prepared (Guzman,
2016a) and unable to deal with an ostensibly machine-inclusive future.
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